The Trump administration plans to defund and shut down the Chemical Safety Board (CSB) by October 2026. At just $14 million per year, this agency offers deep, independent analysis of chemical accidents. Its reports go beyond violations. They expose the human errors, system flaws, and cultural blind spots behind industrial disasters. For decades, the Chemical Safety Board has played a vital role in powder safety, helping facilities prevent repeat incidents through systemic learning and transparent investigation.

For powder processing and chemical facilities, this move could unravel decades of progress. It removes a key safeguard and weakens the global feedback loop that drives engineering, design, and training improvements.

Created under the Clean Air Act in 1998, the CSB has completed over 100 full investigations. Unlike OSHA or the EPA, the CSB doesn’t fine companies. Instead, it identifies root causes, often revealing deeper issues that others miss.

It asks:

• Was the failure technical or organizational?

• Did communication gaps or risk tolerance play a role?

• Are the current standards enough to prevent a repeat?

The agency then publishes findings in publicly accessible reports with actionable recommendations. These reports guide engineers, managers, regulators, emergency responders, and fire authorities worldwide.

Powder processing sites carry unique risks. Fine materials like sugar, corn starch, flour, and polyethylene can ignite and explode under the right conditions. The CSB has investigated some of the most catastrophic of these events:

• 2003: Dust explosions in North Carolina, Kentucky, and Indiana killed 14 people. The CSB’s national study exposed over 280 dust-related incidents from 1980 to 2005, with 119 deaths and 718 injuries. The report cited inconsistent fire-code adoption, poor hazard labeling, and inadequate housekeeping.

• 2008: At Imperial Sugar in Georgia, dust accumulated over time above enclosed conveyors. A hot bearing triggered a primary explosion, which set off a massive secondary blast. Fourteen workers died. The CSB blamed poor ventilation, flawed design, and weak evacuation plans.

• 2017: An explosion at Didion Milling in Wisconsin killed five workers. The CSB found failures in hazard recognition, missing flame-resistant gear, and a broken safety culture. Dust was allowed to accumulate inside process equipment. Preventable risks were ignored.

Each case led to improvements in NFPA standards, OSHA rulemaking, and global awareness. Without the CSB, these lessons may have gone unnoticed.

Regulations provide minimum safety requirements. NFPA 654 outlines controls for dust collection, explosion suppression, and ignition prevention. OSHA enforces systems for training, maintenance, and emergency readiness.

But compliance doesn’t mean safety. Many facilities meet standards on paper but fail under stress. Only real-world testing and failure analysis reveal what works.

The CSB plays this role. It shows where systems break, even when protocols were followed. Its reports uncover flawed data sheets, outdated procedures, and management shortcuts. OSHA inspections often miss these deeper issues.

Removing the CSB means losing the only federal body focused entirely on systemic failure analysis. It breaks the cycle of learning and redesign that underpins long-term safety progress.

CSB investigations influence far more than just U.S. industry. Their reports are cited by:

• European and Asian regulators

• Plant designers and engineers

• Equipment suppliers and safety trainers

• Insurance firms and ESG investors

Designers in Germany, Japan, Brazil, and the UK use CSB findings to validate systems and update training. ISO and NFPA standards often trace their roots back to CSB case data.

Shutting down the agency removes a global reference point. It weakens standardization efforts and reduces the data needed for evidence-based safety policy. European lawmakers will still act, but with one less lens through which to assess emerging risks.

Safety isn’t just technical. It’s cultural. The CSB has increasingly emphasized human factors in its reviews:

• Why didn’t workers report the issue?

• Was production prioritized over safety?

• Did leadership miss signs of danger?

These questions go beyond any rulebook. The CSB’s “Dust Hazard Learning Review” showed how fragmented ownership and pressure to deliver cause systemic drift toward danger.

Without independent oversight, facilities normalize risk. They tolerate shortcuts. They stop asking hard questions until it’s too late.

If the CSB disappears, industry must step up. Some options:

• Internal Safety Boards: Facilities could form independent review teams for major incidents.

• Trade Associations: Groups like the American Chemistry Council and NFPA can create shared databases and best-practice networks.

• Insurer Incentives: Coverage providers may require participation in transparent safety programs.

• International Collaboration: The EU and UK could co-develop an open incident-reporting platform to replace lost insight.

These steps matter. But they require funding, cooperation, and trust—three things public institutions like the CSB were designed to provide.

The planned defunding of the Chemical Safety Board is more than a cost-saving measure. It removes the only U.S. agency focused solely on uncovering industrial blind spots. For powder and bulk solids facilities, this could mean fewer lessons learned, slower safety improvements, and more lives at risk.

Without the CSB, engineers must rely on internal data and scattered reports. Global collaboration may slow. Standards may evolve without the benefit of shared failure analysis. And worst of all, preventable disasters may return.

For anyone in the powder industry, the message is clear: safety depends on independent oversight. If that layer disappears, it’s up to industry leaders, designers, and regulators worldwide to step into the gap—and make sure the next Imperial Sugar doesn’t happen on their watch.